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Christ　As　the　Problem　of　Analogy：Concerning
　　the　TheologicaトAnalogical　Sigrlificance　of
　　　　　　　　　Qand　the　Gospel　of　Thomas
Tokiyuki　Nobuhara
　　　　　　My　proposal　of　analogy，　named　Analogi’α、4c’ゴo％ゴs，　as
regards　the　problem　of　the　relationship　between　the　historical
Jesus　and　the　Christ　of　faith　has　been　schematically　articulated
in　an　article　entitled“ノlnelogi’α！1ctionis：ANew　Proposal　for
Christology‘From　Below’，”I　and　it　has　been　further　clahfied　in
apaper　entitled“Re－defining　Anelo92’a／lction’　is　in　Terms　of　a
Study　of　Son－of－Man　Christology，”2　within　the　context　of　an
examination　of　what　constitutes　the　Christology　in　the　Gospel
according　to　Mark．　Basic　to　my　proposal　is　the　idea　that　our
critical－historical　concern　with　the　historical　Jesus　is　related
significatively　in　some　way　or　another　to　the　coming－into－existence
of　the　confession　by　the　primitive　Church　of　Jesus　as　the“risen
Christ，”an　idea　that　has　been　critically　examined　and　clearly
elucidated　in　his　own　way　by　Wolfhart　Pannenberg　through　his
thesis　of　Christology“from　below”in　Jesus－GtU　andル勉π．3
　　　　　And　I　hold　that　this　significative　relationship　between　the
two　realms　of　concem　can　best　be　conceived　in　terms　of　analogy，
the　idea　that　negates　both　a　flat　identity　or　sameness　and　an
insoluble　separation　between　any　two　reasonably　possible　entities
or　ideas　or　categories．　Thus，　it　may　be　important　for　us　in　this
article　to　clarify　our　analogical　position（which　I　designate　as
“Christ　As　the　Problem　of　Analogy”）vis－a－vis　such　representative
authors　of　Christology　on　the　contemporary　theological　arena
as：John　Hick，　Burton　L．　Mack，　and　James　M．　Robinson．　This
is　because　our　final　concern　with　their　Christologies　is　solely
for　the　purpose　of　putting　forward　in　a　really　convincing　manner
the　theological　analogical　significance　of　the　Book　of　Q　and　the
Gospel　of　Thomas．
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1．」ohn　H　ick，　TheルletaPhor　of（誠Incamate
　　　　　As　far　as　the　issues　of　non－identity　and　inseparableness
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　’mentioned　above　are　concerned，　I　concur　with　John　Hick　s
overall　orientation　toward　a“metaphorica1”understanding　of
Divine　Incarnation　that　does　not　hold　up　the　development　of
theologies“which　are　compatible　with　the　growing　contemporary
acceptance　of　Christianity　as　one　valid　way　among　others　of
conceptualizing　and　responding　to　the　divine．”3a　A　naive　theological
literalism　in　understanding　the　Incarnation，　which　necessarily
gives　rise　to　Christian　absolutism　or　exclusivism，　would　not
apPreciate　other　religious　Ways　as　authentic．　It　is　important，　in
this　sense，　that　Hick　is　mindful　enough　of　the　importance　of
religious　pluralism　as　in　the　above　only　in　tandem　with　his
metaphorical　Christology．　Accordingly，　he　can　write：
Such　theologies　Will　not　see　the　idea　of　God’sincarnation
in　the　life　of　lesus　as　haVing　a　literal　physical　or　psychological
or　metaphysical　meaning．　But　this　does　not　entail　that　it
has　no　meaning．　Let　us　consider　the　alternative　possibility
that‘incamation，　in　its　theological　use　is　a　metaphor。　It
is　an　unusual　kind　of　metaphor，　since　it　began　as　literally
intended　language．　The　more　usual　transition　is　in　the
opposite　direction，　a　metaphor‘dying’as　metaphor　to
become　literal　speech．　But　in　the　case　of　divine　incamation
the　initial　idea　has　proved　to　be　devoid　of　literal　meaning
and　accordingly　identified　as　metaphor，　functioning　in　a
way　that　is　continuous　with　its　non－religious　uses．（MGI，104）
　　　　　What　are　the　basic　contents　of　his　metaphorical　Christology，
then？He　further　writes：
In　the　case　of　the　metaphor　of　divine　incarnation，　what
was　lived　out，　made　flesh，　incarnated　in　the　life　of　Jesus
can　be　indicated　in　at　least　three　ways，　each　of　which　is
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an　aspect　of　the　fact　that　Jesus　was　a　human　being　excep－
tionally　open　and　responsive　to　the　divine　presence：　（1）
in　so　far　as　Jesus　was　doing　God’swill，　God　was　acting
through　him　on　earth　and　was　in　this　respect‘incarnate’
in　Jesus’life；（2）In　so　far　as　Jesus　was　doing　God’swill
he‘incarnated’the　ideal　of　human　life　lived　in　openness
and　response　to　God；（3）In　so　far　as　Jesus　lived　a　life　of
self－giving　love，　or　agape，　he　‘incarnated’　a　love　that　is
afinite　reflection　of　the　infinite　divine　love．　The　truth　or
appropriateness　of　the　metaphor　depends　upon　its　being
literally　true　that　Jesus　lived　in　obedient　response　to　the
divine　presence，　and　that　he　lived　a　life　of　unselfish　love．
（MGI，105）
Hick’sthreefold　metaphorical　understanding　of　divine　incamation
in　Jesus’life　mentioned　abOve　is，　to　my　own　surprise，　interestingly
akin　to　what　I　have　written（originally　in　1979　as　a　term　paper
for　Professor　James　M．　Robinson　at　Claremont　Graduate　School）
in　the　paper　mentioned　earlier，“Re－defining、4nelogr’a　Actionis　in
Terms　of　a　Study　of　Son－of－Man　Christology，”in　reference　to
my　idea　of　anelo8諺゜a　aCtiom’s．　I　wrote：
ノlnαlogia　actionis　is　a　theological　thesis　thatαc’ゴoノ診su
（including　his　person，　actions，　and　words）is　analogous
to　the　Christ．　That　means　that（1）this　thesis　presupposes
aradical　distinction　of　Jesus　of　Nazareth　and　the　Christ，
that　（2）Jesus　is　a　decisively　unique　self－expression　of　the
Christ，　and　that（3）Jesus　as　a　human　figure　is　obedient
and　correspondent　to　the　Christ．（p．3）
　　　　　Obviously，　Hick’sfirst　view　of　the　incarnation　in　terms
of“God　acting　through　Jesus　on　earth”corresponds　to　my　point
two，　dealing　with“a　decisivley　unique　self－expression　of　the
Christ，”while　his　second　view　of　Jesus’life　as　the　incarnation
of“the　ideal　of　human　life　lived　in　openness　and　response　to
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God”fitting　in　with　my　point　three　in　reference　to“Jesus　as　a
human　figure　obedient　and　correspondent　to　the　Christ”；his
third　view　of　Jesus’life’as　the　incarnation　of“a　love　that　is　a
finite　reflection　of　the　infinite　divine　love”is，　if　I　am　correct，
basically　in　parallel　with　my　point　one，　speaking　of“a　radical
distinction　of　Jesus　of　Nazareth　and　the　Christ．”
　　　　　However，　one　big　difference　between　Hick　and　me　is　the
fact　that　what　he　calls“God”is　rendered，　in　my　case，　into　the
language　of“the　Christ．”What　is　basically　significant　in　my　use
of　the　language“the　Christ”is，　as　I　would　like　to　emphasize
here　again，　Katsumi　Takizawa’snotion　of　the　Proto－factzam
Immanuel（i．e．，the“fundamental”fact　of　God　being“with”us，
which　is　thus　coterminous，　in　Takizawa’sown　view，　with“the
Johannine　notion　of　Logos”）especially　under　its　（to　use　his
own　terminology）“functional”or，　I　might　say，　incamate　phase．
This　is　important　because　what　I　perceive　in　Takizawa’snotion
is　the　basic“inseparableness”（as　combined　with　two　other
elements　of“non－identifiability”and“irreversibility”）of　God
and　humanity（including　Jesus　and　others）as　this　constitutes
what　can　even　be　called　a　literal，　metaphysical　bond　at　the　base
of　our　existence．　The　understanding　of　this　state　of　affairs　is，
however，　simply　lacking　in　Hick’sargument　for　the　metaphorical
view　of　divine　incarantion　in　Jesus　of　Nazareth－and　this　understadably
so，　because　this　is　the　very　reason　why　he　is　necessitated　to
opt　for　Theocentrism，　rather　than　Christocentrism，　in　his
pluralistic　attitude　toward　other　great　religions．
　　　　　Given　the　above　clarification　of　the　last，　and　yet　crucial，
difference　of　my　position（entitled／4nalogt°a／4ctionis）regarding
the　relationship　between　the　historical　Jesus　and　the　Christ　of
faith　from　Hick’s（as　manifest　in　his　7初Mata伽qプGha1　imamae）
amid　our　otherwise　close　affinities，　it　now　turns　out　that　the
enterprise　of　theological　analogy　would　be　more　appropriately
effective　than　Hick’stype　of　metaphorical　theology　in　articulating
the　relationship　in　question．　I　would　contend　that　Hick’s
metaphorical　language　cannot　cover　or　shed　new　light　upon
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the　ontological　dimension　of　Jesus’being（commensuate　with
the　being　of　the　rest　of　us）as　fundamentally“with”God　although
it　is，　to　be　sure，eloquently　expressive　of　how　Jesus　is　attitudinally
responsive　to　the　divine　presence．
　　　　　　In　this　sense，　his　is　an　endeavor　of　accountig　for　the
matter　of　Christology　from　the　perspective　of　its　ordo　cog犯oscθ纏
（epistemological　order）without　taking　into　account　its　ordo
e∬θ励（ontological　order）at　the　same　time．　By　contrast，　ours
is　an　epistemological　cum　ontological　grasp　of　the　matter　of
Christology，　in　the　following　twofold　sense：Namely，（i）we
realize　ontologically，　on　the　one　hand，　that　the　above－mentioned
Pアo’o－faCtum　immanue1，　as　this　exists　at　the　bottom　of　any　and
every　human　being，　expresses　itself　of　its　own　accord　in　the
person　and　fate　of　Jesus　of　Nazareth；（ii）we　at　the　same　time
recognize　epistemologically，　on　the　other　hand，　that　as　a
human　person　Jesus　expresses　in　himself　the　reality　of　God　with
us　to　the　full　while　responding　to　this　same　reality　genuinely
obediently．4
　　　　　1n　this　particular　sense，　actioノ診sπ　（involving　his　entire
existence－not　just　his　outward　actions　but　also　his　words，
ideas，　and　feelings）can　be　conceived　as“faithfully　corresponding”
to　the　Christ　as　the　ever－living　reality　of　God　with　us－that　is，
as　anelo82°cal　after　the　manner　of　Karl　Barth’sidea　of　analogi’a
fidei，　which　looks　upon“analogia，”or“man’sconformity　with
the　Word　of　God　posited　in　this　conformity，”as“the　sole　work
of　the　actual　grace　of　God，［such］that　the　only　final　word　left
us　at　this　point　is　that　God　acts　in　His　word　on　man，”but　not
as“≠氏@inborn　or　accessory　attribute　of　man．”5　However，　as　is
clear　in　my　argument　here　for　the　relationship　between　the
historical　Jesus　and　the　Christ　of　faith，　I　am　using　Barth’s
concept　of　analogi°a　fidei　in　a　fresh　and　different　manner　than
the　original　intention　implied　in　it：namely，　Barth’sconcern
was　with　clarifying“m｛m’sconfomity　in　faith　with　the　Word　of
God　incarnate　in　Jesus　the　Christ　as　a　whole（that　is，　with　no
conscious　scholarly　distinction　between　Jesus　and　the　Christ）．！’
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　　　　　Hence，　my　thesis　of／4nalogi曹α、4ctionis　comes　up　in　my
mind　as　a　new　proposal　for　Christology“from　below，”in　the
sense　that　we　differentiate　in　the　matter　of　Christology　the
point　of　departure，　the　historical　Jesus，　from　the　point　of
confessional　culmination，　the　Christ　of　faith，　while　at　the　same
time　never　failing　to　correlate　one　to　the　other　by　way　of　the
analogy　of　action．　For　this　very　reason，　I　basically　look　upon
“Christ”as　the　problem　of　analogy　with“the　historical　J6sus．”
II．　Burton　L．　Mack，　The　Lost　GosPel　：7he　EIOok　of　Q　and
　　Cha’Stian伽9診’ns　a　nd　1職）Wrote’んe」～「ew　Testa〃mu～’
　　The　Making（ガ伽G厩’stianル1Pth
A．The　Problem　o∫Q
　　　　　It　seems　to　me　that　Mack　conceives　of　what　I　called　in
the　above　the　relationship　between　the　historical　Jesus　and　the
Christ　of　faith　in　terms　of“mythmaking．”In　order　to　make　this
point　clear　let　me　quote　a　crucial　passage　from　Mack’sThe　Lost
（］osPel：
The　narrative　gospels　can　no　longer　be　read　as　the　records
of　historical　events　that　generated　Christianity．　Q　puts　us
in　touch　with　the　earlier　history　of　the　Jesus　movements，
and　their　recollections　of　Jesus　are　altogether　different．
The　first　followers　of　Jesus　did　not　know　about　or　imagine
any　of　the　dramatic　events　upon　which　the　narrative
gospels　hinge．　These　include　the　baptism　of　Jesus；his
conflict　with　the　Jewish　authorities　and　their　plot　to　kill
him；Jesus’instnユction　to　disciples；Jesus’transfiguration，
march　to　Jerusalem，　last　supper，　trial，　and　crucifixion　as
king　of　the　Jews；and　finally，　his　resurrection　from　the
dead　and　the　stories　of　an　empty　tomb．　All　of　these
events　must　and　can　be　accounted　for　as　mythmaking　in
the　Jesus　movements，　with　a　little　help　from　the　martyrology
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of　the　Christ，　in　the　period　after　the　Roman－Jewish　war．6
　　　　　　Here　it　is　important　to　know　that　by　New　Testament
scholars’critical　historical　studies　of　the　Book　of　Q　the　core　of
the　problem　of　the　historical　Jesus　has　been　radically　shifted
from　within　the　narrative　gospels（i．e．，the　Gospels　according
to　Mark，　Mathew，　Luke，　and　John）back　onto　the　sayings　of
Jesus　that　were　edited　and　created　by　a　group　of　people　in　the
interest　of　compelling　social　visions．　In　his　1971　English　article
entitled“‘Logoi　Sophon’：On　the　Gattung　of　Q”（“Sayings　of
the　Sages：on　the　Genre　of　Q”），　as　Mack　notices，　James　Robinson
has　come　to　the　conclusion　that　the　genre　of　Q　was　a　common
form　of　wisdom　literature　as　discernible　in　the　early　Christian
collections　of　sayings　such　as　Q　itself，　Thomas，　the　parables　in
Mark　4，　the　Didache，　and　several　Coptic－Gnostic　writings（LG，
35）．
　　　　　Although　John　KloPPenborg　in　his　1987　book　The　Formation
qプQput　Robinson’sthesis　to　the　test　and　revised　it　by　suggesting
that　Q　had　taken　shape　in　stages，　that　it　had　a　history　of
collection　and　composition，　scholars，　at　any　rate，　have　finally
got　the　real　point　of　departure　for　considering　the　historical
Jesus－namely　in　terms　of　Jesus’sayings（LG，35，36）．Especially
the　fact　that　not　only　the　earlier　sayings　involving“sapiential
instruction”@but　also　the　prophetic　and　apocalyptic　sayings　could
also　be　seen　as　a　layer　of　material－a　later　layer　Kloppenborg
called“the　announcement　of　judgment”－points　in　itself　to　a
process　of“mythmaking”as　this　already　existed　in　the　Jesus
movements．　Mythmaking　in　what　sense？In　the　sense　of　1α）物g
u伽Jbsus　not　only　as　a“wisdom　teacher”but　also　as　a“prophet．”
What　is　involved　herein　is　a　new，伽ρ〃discovery　of　Jesus．
This　process　of　coming　to　terms　with　a　new，　deeper　Jesus　is，　if　I
am　correct，　the　process　of“m　yth－making．”
　　　　　Here　the　connotation　of　the　term“myth”has　something
to　do　with　what　Mack　calls“imaginative　embellishments”as
when　he　refers　to　it　in　the　following　context：“The　fantastic
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portrayal　of　Jesus　in　the　narrative　gospels　was　the　result　of　a
layered　history　of勿zagz’netive　6〃め61〃曲〃2θ勉∫of　a　founder　figure，
not　historical　reminiscense，　not　a　meditation　on　the　way　in
which　spiritual　life　was　generated　from　a　crucifixion”（LG，247；
italics　mine）．　In　this　understanding　of“myth（s）”Mack　is
motivated，　I　might　say，　constitutively（consti’uendo）as　a　New
T¢stament　analyzer　of　the　making　of　the　Christian　myth，　whereas
in　the　case　of　John　Hick　mentioned　earlier，　what　is　important
for　him　as　a　systematic　theologian　or　philosopher　of　religion　is
to　get　rid　of　the　literalism　peculiar　to　the　Christian　myth
remotively（renzozAento），　thus　tuming　to　the　language　of“metaphor．”
　　　　　However，　what　is　more　important　in　this　context，　let　me
emphasize，　is　to　grasp　the　New　Testament　reality　of　the　Christian
myth　in　its　entire，　two－fold　significative　function，　remotive　and
constitutive．7　That　is　to　say，　we　need　to　attend，　on　the　one
hand，　to　the　fact，　which　shows　the　crtitical　importance　of　New
Testament　scholarship　like　Mack’s，　that“The　discovery　of　Q
effectively　challenges　the　privilege　granted　the　narrative　gospels
as　depictions　of　the　historical　Jesus”（LG，250）．　Remotively
speaking，　we　now　know　that　narrative　gospels　are　also　products
of“mythic　imagination”in　the　capacity　of“foundation　stories，”
but　not　historical　realities　in　themselves．　This　is　important
despite　the　following　critical　situation　surrounding　the　Christian
myth　in　Westem　Christendom：
Myths，　mentalities，　and　cultural　agreements　function　at　a
level　of　acceptance　that　might　be　called　sanctioned　and
therefore　restricted　from　critical　thought．　Myths　are
difficult　to　criticize　because　mentalities　turn　them　into
truths　held　to　be　self－evident，　and　the　analysis　of　such
cultural　assumptions　is　seldom　heard　as　good　news．（LG，
251）
　　　　　Now，　constitutively　speaking，　on　the　other　hand，　we　are
forced　to　acknowledge　that　inasmuch　as　the　story　of　Q　gives　us
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an　account　of　Christian　origins　that　is　not　dependent　upon　the
narrative　gospels，　it　shows　us“that　the　notion　of　a　pure　origin
is　mythic　and　that　the　process　of　endowing　Jesus　with　szeperlatiue
wisdom　and　divinity　was　and　is　a　mode　of　mythmaking”（LG，
256；italics　mine）．Thus　Mack　ends　up　with　his　doctrine　of
“mythmaking”positively　enou，gh．　But　there　occurs　in　my　mind
aserious　question　precisely　at　this　juncture：What　was　in
actuality　and　is　in　general　the“power”of　mythmaking　by　virtue
of　which　Jesus　people　were　able　to　conceive　of　Jesus　afresh？
Mack　never　asks　this　question，　oddly　enough．　His　only　scholarly
recourse　in　this　regard　is　the　idea　of“compelling　social　visions”
（LG，257）．
　　　　　My　own　conviction　here，　however，　is　as　follows．　It　is
precisely　in　this　conjunction　that　I　can　re－evaluate　and　creatively
re－utilize　Karl　Barth’snotion　of　Analogia　Fidei，　in　the　sense　of
the　prevenient　divine　action　in　the　midst　of　the　divine－human
encounter／conformity　in　faith　that　is　to　be　responded　by　the
believer　faithfully　cor－respondingly（that　is，　analogically），while
shifting　its　thematic　context　from　the　problem　of“faith”to　the
problem　of“Jesus’actions”（involving　his　whole　existence，　both
verbal　and　non－verba1）－the　reason　why　I　opt　for　the　idea　of
、4nelogi°α∠4c’ゴo剛’s．　I　will　articulate　this　issue　of、4nelogi°αActionis
more　fully　later　on　within　the　context　of　two　sayings　gospels，
Qand　Thomas，　after　studying　carefully　Mack’sand　Robinson’s
New　Testament　theologies　and　he皿eneutics　regarding　them．
B．The、Phroble〃t　of　tんe　GosPel　of　71㎞∫
　　　　　It　is　conspicuous　that　Mack　clarifies　the　significance　of
Jesus’teachings　for　his　followers　responsible　for　the　Gospel　of
Thomas　as　lying　in　their　capacity　to　enable　an　individual　to
withstand　society’spressures　to　conform．　According　to　him，　we
can　attend　to　following　different　characteristics　discernible　in
the　Thomas　，　Q，　and　Mark　peoples：
34
［The　Thomas　people］had　meditated　deeply　on　his　sayings
and　taken　seriously　the　challenge　to　diss㏄iate　from　society
and　develop　self－awareness，　self一co㎡idence，　and　self－su鉦iciency．
When　the　Q　people　formed　groups，　started　their　mission，
and　then　retreated　behind　a　smokescreen　of　apocalyptic
pronouncements　when　their　mission　failed，　the　Thomas
people　decided　to　go　their　own　way．　When　Mark’s　community
tried　to　imagine　itself　as　a　determining　factor　in　the
course　of　human　history，　T　the　Thomas　people　thought　that
the　legacy　of　Jesus　had　been　betrayed．（LG，181）
　　　　　This　means　that　before　the　Q　people　tended　to　become
apocalyptic　in　their　missionary　stance，　they　and　the　Thomas
people　had　shared　common　roots　in　the　earliest　stages　of　the
Jesus　movement．　We　can　compare　the　Coptic　Gospel　of　Thomas，
which　was　a　translation　from　a　Greek　original　that　scholars　now
date　to　the　last　quarter　of　the　first　century，　with　Q　and　notice
“that　apProximately　one－third　of　the　sayings　of　Jesus　in　the
Gospel　of　Thomas　have　parallels　in　Q，　and　that　about　60　percent
are　from　the　QI　layer”（LG，181）．　What　are　the　noteworthy
features　of　the　Thomas　tradition，　then，　while　basically　marked
by　a　strong　sense　of　independence？Mack　counts　three　features
as　follows：（1）the　use　of　dialogue　in　order　to　present　the
sayings　of　Jesus　as　answers　to　a　number　of　questions　his　disciples
ask；（2）highly　metaphoric　and　largely　enigmatic　content　of　the
teachings　of　Jesus　showing　that　true　knowledge　is　self一㎞owledge；
and（3）the　riddle－1ike　feature　of　the　sayings（LG，182－3）．
　　　　　　Especially　unique　is　the　second　feature，　in　that　the
contents　of　the　teachings　have　no　parallel　in　Q．　This　is　because
although　all　of　them　are　what　might　be　called　second－level
elaborations　on　those　sayings　that　do　have　a　parallel　in　Q，　they
themselves　have　to　do　with　a　shift　from　aphoristic　injunctions
to　a　proto－Gnostic　treatise　which　manifests　the　mythology　of
Jesus　as“the　child　of　wisdom　and　son　of　God”detached　from
its　epic－apocalyptic　frame　and　centering　instead　around“his
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self－knowledge　as　the　incarnation　of　divine　wisdom”（LG，183）．
By　contrast，　there　was　a　shift　in　Q　from　aphoristic　instruction
to　prophetic　and　apocalyptic　discourse（LG，182）．
　　　　　To　my　mind，　their　content　is　considerably　Zen－like．　For
instance　，　according　to　Mack，
Jesus　refers　to　himself　as　the“light　from　above”（Saying
77）who　represents　all　that　the　disciples　are　to　become．
Once　they　see　it，　however，　they　won’tneed　Jesus　anymore：
“Whoever　drinks　from　my　mouth　shall　become　as　I　am
and　I　myself　will　become　he，　and　the　hidden　things　shall
be　revealed　to　him”（Saying　108）．（LG，183）
This　is　reminiscent，　as　far　as　I　am　concerned，　of　the　Zen
saying，　which　one　of　the　leading　Zen　philosophers　of　our　time
and　the　founder　of　the　F．A．S　movement，　Shin’ichi　Hisamatsu
liked　pretty　much，　as　follows：“On　encountering　the　Buddha，
you　kill　him；on　encountering　a　patriarch，　you　kill　him．”What
is　essential　to　Hisamatsu’sZen　philosophy　is　the　Formless　Self
who“is　I，”thus　constituting，　in　my　view，　the　intrinsic　value
of　human　nature，　Beauty，　which　is　the　most　fundamental　value
of　all　values，　including　intrinsic，　intended　instrumenta1，　and
pragmatic　values，　that　is，　Beauty，　Goodness　and　Praxis．8
　　　　　However，　in　the　course　of　the　development　of　the　making
of　the　Christian　myth，　or　even　in　the　antecedent　course　of　the
development　of　Q　itself　within　the　context　of　the　Jesus（and　not
the　Christ）movements，　this　element　of　the　intrinsic，　formless
“self”－which　is　referred　to　as“sapiential　instruction”manifesting
itself　in　Q1－was　overshadowed　by　other　elements，　such　as　the
“announcement　of　judgment”as　Q2　and　the　later　additions
including　the　story　of　Jesus’temptation　constituting　Q3．　The
process　of　mythmaking　was　further　pursued，　as　is　well　known，
by　the　Markan　formation　of　the　passion　narrative　and　the
Pauline　theology　of　the　Christ　based　upon　and　incorporating
into　itself　on　his　own　the　Christ　cult　to　which　he　was　converted，
＼
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tO　name　jUSt　tWO　majOr　eXampleS．9
　　　　　Yet，　what　is　fundamental　in　Q　and　Thomas　is　never　to
be　missed．　We　have　to　explore　its　own　peculiar，“livable”or
“existential”significance（to　use　Mack’sphraseology，　its“inde－
pendence”@（see　LG，181，246））precisely　for　the　purpose　of
“rationally”@scrutinizing　and　elucidating　the　process　of　the
making　of　the　Christian　myth　in　correspondence　with　it．10
Without　the　articulation　of　its　own“livable”independence　and
“existential”gravity，　the“rationally　defensible”anatomy　of　the
making　of　the　Christian　myth，　like　Mack’s　in陥o　VVrote伽ハ吻
7セs如纏～，will　end　as　a　basically　groundless　attempt，　ontologically
speaking，　although　culturally　anthropologically　plausible　in
presenting“the　panorama　of　early　Christian　literature　and　social
development　in　a　lucid，　convincing，　and　magisterial　performance”
（Robert　W．　Funk）．
　　　　　　What　I　have　in　mind　when　I　say　as　in　the　above　is　a
picture－namely，　my　persistent　idea　of　Analogia　Actionis　that
permeates　the　present　study　in　its　entirety－as　this　is　ontologically
re－envisioned　in　terms　of　the　analogy　of　attribution　duomm　ad
tertium，　one　of　the　Thomistic　types　of　analogy．　I　have　thematically
studied　this　type　of　analogy　in　order　to　find　ways　in　which　we
can　use　it　in　a　transformatively　creative　fashion　for　contemporary
comparative　philosophy　of　religion　in　an　article　entitled“Portraying
‘Authentic　Existence’by　the　Method　of　Analogy：Toward
Creative　Uses　of　the　Analogy　of　Attribution　duontmα4　tertium
for　Comparativ’?@Ph losophy　of　Religion．”11　Here　suffice　it　to　say
that　this　type　of　analogy　is　creatively　usable　within　the　context
of　the　New　Testament　problem　of　the　relationship　between　the
historical　Jesus　and　the　Christ　of　faith　insofar　as　we　can　find
the　common　ontological　ground　that　goes　beyond　and　above　the
two　actualities　of　the“Jesus　movement（s）”and　what　Mack
refers　to　as“the　Christ　cult”while　subsuming　both　of　them
under　it．
　　　　　The　two　actualities　in　question　constitute　the　analogy　of
attribution　duon（m磁tetium（that　is，　two　to　the　third）inasmuch
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as“狽??@Kingdom　of　God”that　Jesus　proclaimed　in　Q　and，
accordingly，　in　the　Synoptic　Gospels（or　the　“Wisdom”in　the
case　of　Thomas）and“the　risen　Jesus　as　the　Christ　of　faith”
proclaimed　by　the　primitive　Church（the　Christ　cult，　in　Mack’s
terms）can　be　conceived　as　analogically　in　reference　to　the　same
Ultimate　Reality．　An　astute　reader　will　be　reminded　that　we
have　already　provided　discussions　to　this　effect　in　the　two
papers　mentioned　at　the　outset－and　this，　however，　under　the
heading　of！1nalogi’a∠4c’ゴo痂s　only　there．　Now　it　seems　to　me
that　my　vision　of　the　matter　is　clarified　more　fully．　So　I　think　I
can　resort　to　the　picture　of　the　analogy　of　attribution吻o勉〃zα4
tertiu〃z　as　this　is　creatively　re－used　here　in　this　particular
Christological　cam　Jesuological　context　in　conjunction　with
previ　ous　thesis　of．4nelog2層α／1ctiom’s．
lll．　James　M．　Robinson，“Jesus’Parables
　　　As　God　HapPening”
A．The　New　Hermenezaic
　　　　　It　seems　to　me　that　Robinson　has　provided　an　ontological
rationale　for　interpreting　Jesus’parables　in　conceiving　of　them
as“fod　happening．”And　this　is　important　f6r　our　enterprise　in
this　article　because　it　clarifies　the　existence　of　what　is　more
than　just　the　human　faculty　of“mythmaking”at　the　base　of
Jesus’parables　as　these　involve“sapiential　instruction．”The
heart　of　the　matter　here　is　a　new　understanding　of　language
that　Robinson　has　leamed丘om　Heidegger　because　it　is　applicable
to　the　case　of　New　Testament　hermeneutics　dealing　with　Jesus’
parables．　What　he　has　in　mind　as　a　precursor　here　is　the　new
hermeneutic，　formally　launched　by　Ernst　Fuchs’sHermeneutile　in
1954．Fuchs’swork　is　important　for　Robinson，　in　that　it　has
shifted　the　orientation　of　hermeneutic　from　an“understanding　of
existence，”derived　from　the　Bultmannian　interpretation　of　the
earlier　Heidegger，　to　an　understanding　of　language，　derived
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from　the　later　Heidegger．12
　　　　　　At　the　core　of　the　new　hermeneutic　is　the　vision　of
language　as“the　voice　of　being”whose　importance　Robinson
explicates　in　these　words：
This　understanding　of　language　is　intended　as　a　corrective
of　the　earlier　understanding　of　language　primarily　oriented
to“expression，”the　putting　into　words　of　one’sown
subjectivity（Schleiermacher－Dilthey）or　understanding　of
existence（Bultmann）．　In　the　latter　case，　language　was
regarded　as　appropriate　when　it　stayed　within　the　categories
of　existence．　However，　it　was　seen　to　have　a　tendency　to
objectify　existential　meaning，　the　model　example　being　the
mythologizing　of　religion　in　a　mythopoetic　culture，　which
necessitated　the　demythologizing　efforts　of　the　interpreter
（“existentialistic　interpretation”）．But　now　primal　language
is　understood　as　called　forth　by　being，　by　world．　Such
language　itself　becomes　the　most　concrete　manifestation　of
being　or　world，　in　which　sense　the　later　Heidegger　says
that　what　speaks　is　not　so　much　man　as　language　itself．
（NQHJL（）E，203－204）
Precisely　in　accordance　with　this　new　vision　of　language，　it
follows　that“the　parable　is　no　longer　regarded　primarily　as
expressing　Jesus’　existential　understanding，　but　rather　as　the
bringing　into　language　of　world　or　being（in　Jesus’case，　the
Kingdom　of　God）”（NQHJ－OE，204）．
　　　　　　If　so，　Adolf　Julicher’srationalistic　interpretation　of　the
parable　in　1万θGleichnisreden　（1899）is　to　be　criticized　for　regarding
the　parable　as“one　of　the　forms　of　rational　argument，　making
use　of　the　point　of　a　picture　to　argue　for　an　equivalent　point　in
another層р奄高?獅唐奄盾氏@of　reality”（NQHJ－OE，205）．　We　can　notice
here　a　rationalistic　use　of　the　analogy　of　attribution　duom〃z　ad
teitium，　in　the　following　sense：“If　a　comparison　draws　attention
to　the　similarity　between　two　concepts　and　permits　a　rationa1
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judgment　with　regard　to　the　more　obscure　on　the　basis　of　the
‘analogy’to　the　more　clear，　just　so　the　parable　compares　one
set　of　concepts、　to　another，　or，　more　precisely，　compares　the
judgment　contained　in　the　one　set　to　the　judgment　that　should
be　inferred　with　regard　to　the　other”（NQHJ－OE，204）．
B．　The　Anelogt’cal　Sゴ9物゜ノi’cance　o∫ノlasus　’Parables
　　　　　　Robinson　himself　takes　JUIicher’shermeneutic　of　the
parable　as　manifesting　the　classical　analogia　proportionalitatis　or
㎜1㎎宛剛α∫∫o脇．But　since　he　himself　notices　the　proportionateness
of　the　two　sets　of　concepts　as　signifying　that“they　share　one
judgment，　the　tertium　co魏勿アationis，　the　single　point　of　the
parable”（NQHJ－OE，205），the　sort　of　analogy　at　work　in
Julicher’smind　is　not　the　analogy　of　proper　proportionality，　but
the　analogy　of　attribu1ゴon伽zαJ　tertiz〃z　as　this　is　rationalisdcally
re－used　with“judgment”at　its　analogical　center－i．e．，“the
third．”By　contrast，　in　my　creative　use　of　the　same　analogy，
the　tertiary　element　is　not“judgment”but“being”（in　Jesus’
case，　the　Kingdom　of　God）．From　this　perspective，　I　wholeheartedly
concur　with　Robinson　when　he　says：
＿the　new　hermeneutic　has　sought　to　overcome　the
dichotomy　between　act　and　word　by　appeal　to　language　as
meaningful　happening．　This　understanding　of　language
focuses　attention　not　upon　the　conceptual　information
communicated，　but　rather　upon“commuication”in　the
sacramental　meaning　of　the　term：co㎜lmion　or圃cipa廿on．
Its　interest　is　in　what　happens　when　language　takes
place，　the　hapPening　it　calls　forth．（NQHJ－OE，205）
　　　　　That　is　to　say，“being”（in　the　sense　of　the　Kingdom　of
God）is　to　be　actualized　with，　indeed　as，　the　language　of　the
parables　in　Jesus’act　of　being　there　while　at　the　same　time　the
hearer　being　caught　up　into　the　story　along　with　one’ssituation．
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Hbre　we　notice　tihree　phases　of　reality：（1）bei㎎，（2）language－event，
and（3）the　hearer　being　caught　up　into　the　story　along　with
one’唐唐奄狽浮≠狽奄盾氏ii．e．，the　eschatological　fulfillment　of　the
intention　implied　in　the　parables）．131n　my　creative　use　of　the
analogy　in　question　，　phase　2　（language－event）　and　phase　3
（eschatological　fulfillment）are　correlated　to　each　other，　but
only　due　to　the　reality　of　phase　1　（being　as　the　third，　or　the
Ultimate）．This　state　of　affairs　is　beautifully　summed　up　by
Emst　Fuchs　in　these　words：
Language　helps　reality　to　its　truth．　In　faith’sview　it　is
the　possible　that　helps　the　rea1［come］1inguistically　to　its
truth　and　thus　expresses　itself　as　itself，　i．e．，as　what　is
becoming．14
　　　　　Robinson　finds　in　this　passage　Fuchs’sdevelopment　of　the
Bultmannian　interpretation　of　the　future，　as　the　dimension　of
possible　understandings　of　existence，　into　‘‘an　understanding　of
language　as　the　possible，　which　grants　reality　truth”（NQHJ‘OE，
207）．And　he　himself　renders　it　into　his　own　elaboration　as
follows：
Ultimately，　reality　is　admitted　into　its　truth　by　the　language
of　love．　Of　course　language　is　historic，　sharing　in　the
finitude　of　man　and　the　ambiguity　of　his　existence；hence，
reality　is　always　in　varying　degrees　distorted　or　depersonalized，
which　becomes　evident　in　the　current　technological　deper－
sonalizing　of　man。　But　something　more　wholesome　can
also　hapPen　in　language，　as　it　is　called　forth　by　a　differing
world（not　to　be　confused　with　otherwordliness）and
grants　reality　a　new　being，　in　which　its　true　nature　as
love　becomes　audible．　It　is　this　language　event　which　is
both　saving　event　and　God’sword－God’shappening　and
God　happening．（NQHJ－OE，208）
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From　this　point　of　view，　Robinson　perceives　in　the　event　of
彩sus’la㎎guage（通’s　reign　hapPening　as　reality’s　true　possibility－an
㏄currence　that　lies　between　the　presumption　of　the　Establishment
that　identifies　realtiy　with　God　and　the　fanaticism　of　otherworldliness
that　separates　reality　from　God．
　　　　　What　matters　here　for　Robinson　is，　I　might　say，　a　unique
analogical　state　of　affairs　insofar　as　he　says：“Language　thus
serves　to　mark　what　Heidegger　abstractly　called　the　ontological
difference，　the　distinction　but　not　separation　between　things　and
the　orientation　they　have，　between　things　and　their　being”
（NQHJ－OE，209）．　Accordingly，　we　need　to　see　the　parable　as
shot　through　with　this　analogical　state　of　affairs：namely，　phase
1　（“being”as　this　undergirds　Jesus’factuality）：phase　2　（“language
event”with，　indeed　as，　Jesus’parables）：：phase　1（“being”
within　a　new　context　of　the　hearer’s・situation）：phase　3（the
fulfillment　of　the　intention　implied　in　the　parable，　in　that　the
hearer　is　caught　up　into　the　story　along　with　one’ssituation）．
In　a　true　comparison（like　this），　as　Robinson　assumes，　the
retention　of　the　analogous　language　（in　our　case，　the　analogy
of　attribution　duorum　ad　tertium）preserves　distinction　while
preventing　separation．　Thus：“God’sreign　is　analogous　to　the
situation　with　regard　to　a　fisherman’snet，　but　the　Kingdom　of
God　is　not　to　be　identified　with　the　visible　church”（NQHJ－OE，
209－210）．But　why　not？
Concluding　Rema　rks　：
　　　　　In　my　own　opinion，　this　is　because　the　Kingdom　of　God
has　to　be　perveived　repeatedly　anew　as　an“ever－prevenient
reality”vis－b－vis　our　human　social　formation，　as　is　so　advocated
by　Karl　Barth　in　his　proposal　of　Anelogt’a　Fidei，　as　the　language
world　in　terms　of　which　it　is　experienced　proceeds　forward　all
the　time．　Basically　inherent　in　the　parable　is，　in　my　conviction，
the　arrow　of　intentionality　of　showing　this　ever－prevenient
reality　of　God’sreign　in　a　concrete　fashion．　And　the　arrow　will
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take　the　forms　of“evocation”as　follows：
［A］［The　Parable　of　the　Lost　Sheep］
Which　one　of　you，　having　a　hundred　sheep　and　losing
one　of　them，　does　not　leave　the　ninety－nine，　in　the
wilderness　and　go　after　the　one　that　is　lost　until　he　finds
it？When　he　has　found　it．　he　lays　it　on　his　shoulders　and
rejoices．　And　when　he　comes　home，　he　calls　together　his
friends　and　neighbors，　saying　to　them，“Rejoice　with　me，
for　I　have　found　my　sheep　that　was　lost．　Just　so，　I　tell
you，　there　will　be　more　joy　in　heaven　over　one　sinner
who　repents　than　over　ninety－nine　righteous　persons　who
need　no　repentance．（Q　l5：4－7；Luke　15：4－7；NRSV；
italiCS　mine）
　　　　　The　same　arrow　can　be　discerned
cases　as　well，　as　far　as　I　can　see：
in the　following　two
［B］Be　merciful，　just　as
6：36；Luke　6：36；NRSV）
your　Father　is　merciful．（Q
［C］＿and　it　is　no　longer　I　who　live，
who　lives　in　me．（Galatians　2：20；NRSV）
but　it　is　Christ
In　the　first　case［A］，　the　evocation“Rejoice　with　me”shows
the　arrow　of　intentionality　of　God’sreign　as　it　happens　in　the
language　of　Jesus’parables　as　reality’strue　possibility．　The
second　case［B］calls　forth　the　cor－respondence　and　response　to
the　reality　of　the　merciful　God“with　us．”What　is　urged　is　a
faithful　loyalty　in　love　to　the　divine－human　bond，　the　Covenant
of　Love．　In　accordance　with　these　preceding　cases　in　which　is
at　work　the　arrow　of　Jesus’intentionality，　Paul　discloses　his
faith　in　the　Christ．　His　is　a　confessional　language　throu．gh　and
through．　But　who　is　it　that　is　confessing　in　these　words？It　is
not　Paul（“1”）because　it　is　said　that“…it　is　no　longer　I　who
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live”；nor　is　it　Christ，　either　because　Christ　is　the　one　who
lives“in　me．”Someone　is　observing　attentively　this　whole
situation　with　his　own　eyes．　It　is　the　Paul　who　is　dead．
　　　　　　Thus，　inherent　in　the　arrow　of　intentionality　at　issue
here（which，　incidentally，　constitutes　the“power”of　what
Mack　calls“mythmaking”in　his　books　mentioned　earlier）is　the
message　that　the　more　one　dies　to　one’sown　ego－entity　in
cor－respondence　and　response　to　the　“voice　of　being”　that
comes　from　God’sreign　in　the　case　of　the　historical　Jesus　who
speaks　in　Q　and　Thomas，　and　who　acts　in　the　Synoptic　Gospels
in　a　narrative　manner，　the　more　one　is　vivified　by　the“power
of　God”manifest　in　Jesus　as　the　Christ　in　the　case　of　the
kerygmatic　theology　of　Apostle　Pau1（Rom．1：16）to　confess：
“Christ　lives　in　me．”It　is　precisely　in　this　spirit　of　analogy，　in
the　creatively　re－used　sense　of　the　analogy　of　attribution　duom〃z
ed　tertium，　that　I　would　like　to　affirm　the　theological－analogical
significance　of　Q　and　the　Gospel　of　Thomas　in　relation　to　the
Christ　of　faith（as　conf6ssed，　for　instance，　by　Paul　as　living“in
me”j．
　　　　　　As　far　as　the　sorts　of　utterance　involved　herein　are
concerned，　what　we　have　found　in　the　cases　of［A］（Jesus’
parable）and［B］（Q）are　both　imperative　or　evocative　expressions，
“Rejoice　with　me”and“Be　merciful，”whereas　Pau1’smode　of
speech，　as　found　in［C］（Gelatians），　is　indicative　or　confessional．
This　noteworthy　difference　between　them　has　made　sholars　to
think　that　the　former　two　are　ethical　while　the　latter　being
truly　evangelical　in　nature．　But，　basically，　I　do　not　hold　such　a
view．　This　is　because　I　grasp　the　entirety　of　the　sequence　of
the　making　of　the　Christian　myth　analogically，in　the　sense
noted　above．　The　arrow　of　intentionality　can　be　observed　as
flowing　from　Q（and　Thomas　in　its　initial　stage）to　the　Synoptic
Gospels　probably　through　the　medium　of　the　kerygmatic　theology，
as　this　was　represented　by　Paul，　analogically　always　in　relation
to　the　ever－prevenient　Reality，　Jesus’“Kingdom　of　God”and
Paur　s“the　Christ．”15　Whither　does　it　go　further，　then，　in　a
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pluralistic　age　such　as　ours？Ihave　no　better　answer　to　this
question　than　William　Beardslee’sdictum　in　appreciation　for
Amos　Wilder’swork　as　follows：
Thus　his　work　is　extremely　illluminating　in　bringing　to
attention　what　I　have　called　the　context　of　expectation　in
which　parable　and　proverb　are　heard．　It　is　not　surprising
that　his　work　is　pathbreaking　both　to　those　who　find　that
the　exciting　task　is　working　for　a　fresh　view　of　the　tran－
scendent　as　an　ordering　factor，　and　to　those　who　work
for　a　new　imaginative　grasp　of　the　transcendent　as　a
creative　nothingness．　（M［B，79）16
　　　　　In　my　opinion，　these　two　visions　of　the　transcendent　can
both　be　found　in　Galatians　2：20－21．　As　New　Testament　scholar
Seiichi　Yagi　and　Zen　Roshi　Ryomin　Akizuki　jointly　affirm，　Paul
is　definitely　enlightended　when　he　says：“…it　is　no　longer　I
who　live，　but　it　is　Christ　who　lives　in　me”（2：20a）．　171n　this
regard，　Christian　faith　in　the　Christ“who　lives　in　me”is
profoundly　akin　to　Buddhist　satori　as　the　act　of　seeing　into　the
“intrinsic”nature　of　one’sown．　However，　on　the　other　hand，
it　is　oriented　toward　the　redemptive，　historical　principle　of
justification，　which　is　shot　through　with　the“intended　instrumental”
vision　of　life（or　Goodness），inas止nuch　as　Paul　add　these　words：
“and　the　life　I　now　live　in　the　flesh　I　live　by　faith　in　the　Son
of　God，　who　loved　me　and　gave　himself　for　me．　I　do　not
nullify　the　grace　of　God；for　if　justification　comes　through　the
law，　then　Christ　died　for　nothing”（2：20b－21）．This　double
nature　of　Pauline　Christology，　if　my　conjecture　is　correct，
might　have　contributed　to　the　formation　of　the　narrative　gospel
in　Mark，180n　the　one　hand，　while，　on　the　other，　keeping　in
touch　with　the“intrinsic”orientation　peculiar　to　Q　and　Thomas
19－and　this　in　a　critical－dialogical　manner　in　both　cases．
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NOTES
1．　　　伽’on　Se〃za匿ua・ツ（Uarterly　Revi’em，　39／4，　1984，　269－85．
2．　Ateml　paper　for　Dr，　James　M．　Robinson’scourse　on“the
　　　Historical　Jesus”at　Claremont　Graduate　School　in　the　spring
　　　semester　of　1979，　now　revised　in　1996（unpublished）to　be
　　　incorporated（together　with　the　present，　the　above－mentioned，
　　　and　other　articles）into　the　book　entitled　Christ／15’加Proうlem
　　　可加10gy’Beymd〃昭7】heology（）f　Karl　linrth．
3．　E㎎．trans．　Lewis　L　Wilkins　and　Duane　A．　Priebe（砺厩」微x’
　　　The　VVes’〃za’nster、Phress，　1968，　1977）．
3a・　Jo　hn　Hick，　Theルletaphor　oアGed　Incarnate　：Christology　in　a
　　　Plura〃s’ゴc／㎏θ（Louisville，　KY：Westminster／John　Knox　Press，
　　　1993），p．104．（Hereafter　cited　as　MGI．）
4．　　Isuspect　that　Crossan’sreference　to　the　incarnation　in　a
　　　metaphorical　or　symbolical　perspective　in　his陥o　Ki〃ed／llszts～：
　　　EψOSゴ㎎伽ROO’S　O∫！励一Se〃Z跳〃Z　in伽GosPel　S’鍔of　the　D召痂
　　　of　lesus（San　Francisco：HarperSanFrancisco，1995；hereafter
　　　cited　as　WKJ），1ike　Hick’s，　might　also　be　suggestive　of　his
　　　uncIarity　about　this　issue：He　writes：“I　answer　again　and　again
　　　that，　for　the丘rst　as　for　the　twenty－first　century，　Jesus　was　and
　　　is　divine　for　those　who　experience　in　him　the　manifestation　of
　　　God”（WKI，216；italics　his）．　He　does　not　clearly　differentiate
　　　the　manifestation　of　God　by　Godself　in　Jesus　from　the　man挽station
　　　of　God　by　Jesus　in　himself．　If　he　had　distinguished　between　the
　　　two，　he　would　not　have　said：“Christian　faith　tells　us　how　the
　　　historical　Jesus（fact）is　the　manifestation　of　God　for　us　here
　　　and　now（interpretation）．You　cannnot　believe　in　a　fact，　only
　　　in　an　interpretation”（WKJ，217）．　It　is　my　contention，　however，
　　　that　you　only　can　beieve　in　that　which　enables　you　to　interpret
　　　the　historical　Jesus　（fact）in　relation　to　the　Christ　of　faith，　but
　　　not　in　a　human　interpretation　as　such．　That　enabler，　for　me，　is
　　　what　Takizawa　calls　the　P70’o－faCtum　Immanuel，　as　is　evident　in
　　　my　argument　throughout　the　present　study．
5．　Kad　Barth，　C㎞加㈱1／1，　trans．　G。T．ThQmson（Ed血burgh：
　　　T．＆T．Clark，1931），p．280．
6．　Burt　on　L　Mack，　The」【ρs’Gospel．’The召oo々o∫Qand　Christian
　　　O厚即’ms（｝血rperSanFrancisco，1993），　p．247；itahcs　mine．（Hereafter
　　　cited　as　LG．）
7．　As　to　the　two－fold　significative　function　of　a　concept（e．g．，
　　　nihの，　see　Desmond　Paul　Henry，　The、乙ogic　o∫Saint．肋sθ伽
　　　（Oxford　at　the　Cla】℃ndon　Press，1967），　p．210；Co〃z〃mUuty　on　De
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8．
9．
10．
11．
12．
13．
Gramatico：The研5’（rricat一乙ogt’cal．0伽ensions　oアaDialogne　o∫S’．
Anse’〃ゼs（Dordrecht，　Holland／Boston，　U．S．A．：D．Reidel　Publ．
Co．，1974），P．337．
　　See　my　article“Hartshorne　and　Hisamatsu　on　Human　Nature：
AStudy　of　Christian　and　Buddhist　Metaphysical　Anthoropology”
（御〃etin　o∫Keiua　Co〃ege，　No．5，　February　29，1996），1－49，　esp．
6－12．
　　See　Burton　L．Mack，　Who　Wrote　the〈rew　Testament～’The
ルlaking　oア〃te　Christian　Mpth（HarperSanFrancisco，1995），pp．76，
152－61．
　　There　are　two　aspects　to　the　pragmatic　value　of　human
nature，“livable　or　existential”and“rationally　defensible，”that
are　to　be　taken　into　consideration　when　we　analyze　and　evaluate
developments　of　human　social　formation　of　whatever　kind．　See
my　afore－mentioned　article“Hartshorne　and　Hisamatsu　on
Human　Nature，”17－19，23－26．
　　Bu〃etin　o∫Keima　Co〃ege，　No．1，　February　28，1992，61－83；
No．2，　Fe　bruary　28，1993，27－50；and　No．3，　February　28，1994，
1－19．
　　James　M．Robinson，、4　N召ωQztest　of　the伍s，（廊α！lesus　and
Orher　dSays（Philadelphia：Fortress　Press，1983），p，203．（Hereafter
cited　as　NQHJ」OE．）
　　These　three　phases　of　reality　are　profoundly　remin童scent　of
the　three　stages　of　development　of　the　universe　art量culated　in
Nishida’sphilosohy：pure　experience，　self－awareness，　and
place．　As　I　have　demonstrated　elsewhere，　Nishida’sthree　stages
are　correlative　to　the　problems　of　the　ground　of　concrescence，
the　act　of　concrescence　or　creation　here－now，　and　its　consequence
（i．e．，satisfaction）in　Whitehead’sphilosophy．　In　poetic　language，
the　same　idea　is　expressed　by　the　Japanese　haiku　genius　Basho
in　these　words：
　Furu　ike　ya！　　　　　The　old　pond，ah！　　　（Stage　A）
　Kawazu　tobikomu，　Afrog　jumps　in：　　　　（Stage　B）
　Mizu　no　oto．　　　　The　water’ssound！　　（Stage　C）
（See　Tokiyuki　Nobuhara，“How　Can　Pure　Experience　Give　Rise
to　Religious　Se正一awareness　and　Then　to　the　Topological　Argument
for　the　Existence　of　God　Cogently？：Nishida，　Whitehead，　and
Pannenberg，”PtnTasesu　S雇50［Pr㏄ess　Thought］，　No．6，　September
1995，　125－150）．
　　Now，　in　order　for　us　to　account　for　the　entire　sequence　of
the　three　phases　of　the　advance　of　the　universe　in　a　really
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intelligible　manner，　it　would　be　crucial　that　we　grasp　the　true
meaning　of　the　second　phase，　language　event．　In　this　regard，
D．T．Suzuki’sexplication　of　the　above－mentioned　Basho’shaiku
is　profoundly　suggestive（although　from　the　Buddhist　perspective，
in　his　case）：
It　is　by　intuition　alone　that　this　timelessness　of　the　Unconscious
［i．e．，Basho’s“old　pond”］is　truly　taken　hold　of．　And　this
intuitive　grasp　of　Reality　never　takes　place　when　a　world　of
Emptiness　is　assumed　outside　our　everyday　world　of　the
senses；for　these　two　worlds，　sensual　and　supersensual，　are
not　separa1£but　one．　Therefbre，　the　poet　sees　hlto　bS　Uhconscious
not　through　the　stillness　of　the　old　pond　but　through　the
sound　stirred　up　by　the　jumping　frog．　Without　the　sound
there　is　no　seeing　on　the　part　of　Basho　into　the　Unconscious，
in　which　lies　the　source　of　creative　activities　and　upon　which
all　true　artists　draw　for　their　inspiration．　It　is　difficult　to
describe　this　moment　of　consciousness　where　polarization
ceases　or　rather　starts，　for　these　contradictory　terms　are
applicable　there　without　causing　logical　inconvenience．　It　is
the　poet　or　the　religious　genius　who　actually　has　this　kind　of
experience．　And，　according　to　the　way　this　experience　is
handled，　it　becomes　in　one　case　Basho’shaiku　and　in　the
other　a　Zen　utterance．（Daisetz　T．Suzuki，　Zen　and　lapanese
Culture［Princeton，　N．J．：Princeton　University　Press，1970］，
pp．241－242．）
14．
　　What　Basho　introduces　into　the　tmth　of　utterance　from　the
Unconscious　by　reference　to　the“frog　jumping　into　the　water”
is，　if　I　am　correct，　in　parallel　with　what　William　A．　Bearslee　as
aNew　Testament　hermeneutician　considers　in　a　Christian
perspective　as“the［Whiteheadian］path　of　rethinking　a　point　of
view　in　which　God　and　the　world　interact，”in　that　it　shows
most　adequately“why，　after　the　moment　of　fracture　of　the
continuity　of　life，　faith　leads　to　a　reentry　into　the　continuing
social　relationships　of　men　and　women”（ルlargi°ms　o∫Belonging：
E∬αアson　the　1＞伽Testament　and　Theology［Atlanta，　Georgia：
Scholars　Press］，1991，　p．78；hereafter　cited　as　MB）．　In　a　word，
after　the　frog’sjumping　there　will　be“the　water’ssound，”
which　is　the　sound　of　both“the　frog”（the　individual）and“the
old　pond”（the　Unconscious　or　the　Transindvidual）at　once　in
their　oneness　in　action，　in　my　own　view．
　　Ernst　Fuchs，　Hermenezttik（Bad　Cannstadt：R．　M廿llerschon，
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15．
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1954），p．211；cited　in　NQHJ－OE，207．
　　This　is　my　own　hypothesis　regarding　the　making　of　the
Chirstian　myth．　At　its　core　is　a　philosphical　reasoning　I　have
developed　in　the　article“How　Can　Pure　Experience　Give　Rise　to
Religious　Self－awareness　and　Then　to　the　Topological　Argument
for　the　Existence　of　God　Cogently？：Nishida，　Whitehead，　and
Pannenberg”（Ptarosesu　5履恰o［Process　Thought］，　No．6，　September
l995）to　this　effect：as　is　manifested　by　Kitaro　Nishida　in　his
philosphical　development　as　a　whole，　the　first　stage　of“pure
experience”@and　the　third　stage　of“discursive　explanation　of　all
things　in　the　universe”are　to　be　mediated　by　the　second　stage
of“self－awareness”（JPn．，ゴikaku）having　to　do　with　the　vision
of　reality（see　pp．133－40，144－47）．　In　the　case　of　the　making
of　the　Christian　myth，　it　seems　to　me，　Q　and　Thomas，　located
at　the　first　stage　of“wisdom，”proceeds　into　the　third　stage　of
“ap㏄alyptic　explanation　of　the　universe”in　the　Synoptic（、）spels
（beginning　with　Mark）only　through　the　medium　of　the　kerygmatic
theological“vision　of　reality”@（such　as　the　vision⑳αconfession
that“知sus　is　the　Christ”）as　enabled　by　somebody’sself－awareness
（such　as　Paul’sin　Galatians　2：20“…量t　is　no　longer　I　who　live，
but　it　is　Christ　who　lives　in　me”）．Thus，　the　second　mediative
stage　is　indispensable　to　any　serious　religious　formation　of
“myths”or“belief－systems．”If　it　is　lacking　as　in　the　case　of
Shoko　Asahara’sAum－Shinriky6，　the　first　stage，　as　practiced
by　his“Tibetan　Buddhist　meditation　，”and　the　third　stage，　as
symbOliZed　by　his　resort　to　the“Christian　apocalyptic　interpretation
of　the　world　by　the　idea　of　Armageddon，”are　in　jeopardy　of
splitting　into　two　pieces．　It　is　precisely　for　the　sake　of　filling
this　gap　that　he　needed　to　create　an　artificial，“virtual”@reality
by　the　threatening　power　of　a　poisonous　gas，　sarin，　that　his
followers　used　theraby　committing　atrocities　against　civilians　in
Tokyo　in　the　spring　of　1995．
　　What　Beardslee　has　in　mind　in　saying　so　is　John　B．　Cobb，
Jr．’sepoch－making　article　in　contemporary　theology　of　the
world　religions，“Buddhist　Emptiness　and　the　Christian　God，”
IAAR　45（1977），11－25．　Whether　or　not　we　can　find　these　two
visions　of　the　transcendent　in　the　Sayings　Source　is　in　itself　an
important　question　in　Q　scholarship．　If　we　can，　this　will　mean，
as　Elisabeth　Schuessler　Fiorenza　assumes，　that　a　histor童cal－
theological　argument，　such　as　is　capable　of　understanding　Jesus
and　Jonah　as　the　messengers　of　Sophia　who　continue　but　do
not　close　off　a　long　line　of　prophets，“radically　challenges　the
assumption　of　Q　scholarship　that　the　earliest　layer　of　the　Sayings
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Source　portrays　Jesus　as　a　wandering　Cynic－like　philosopher”
（lesusTMiriam’s　Child，　Sopin’a’s　Pll70Phet’Cn’tical　lssues　in　Femintst
ChriStology［New　York：Continu㎜，1995］，　p．157；hereafter　cited
as　JMCSP）．　Actually，　she　observes　that“ln　contrast　to　Jewish
and　Christian　Apocalyptic　traditions，　the　Wisdom　tradition
values　life，　creativity，　and　well－being　in　the　midst　of　struggle”
（JMCSP，157）．　And　she　writes：
Jesus　as　sage　and　prophet　of　Sophia　provides　us　with　two
christological　images．　One　presents　Jesus　as　a　wise　teacher，
who　in　his　concrete　life　relates　to　our　ongoing　quest　for　a
gracious　G＊d．　The　Sophia－G＊d　of　Jesus　loves　all　humanity
irrespective　of　ethnic　and　social　links　and　shows　concern　for
liberation　and　empowerment　of　the　underprivileged．　The　other
insight　is　that　Jesus’teaching　is　meant　not　only　for　hearing
but　also　for　being　and　acted　upon．　In　Q　we　find　the　earliest
christological　instance　that　presents　Jesus　as　a　spokesperson
for　Wisdom．　In　him　we　find　a　way　to　respond　to　religious
pluralism　and　the　greater　problem　of　suffering　and　injustice．
Nothing　stops　feminist　theologians　from　critically　assessing　the
kyriocentric　framework　of　the　Wisdom　tradition（and　all　other
biblical　traditions）in　order　to　rearticulate　some　of　its　discourses
in　such　a　way　that　wo／men　can　theologically　claim　it．　We
must，　however，　shape　this　discourse　in　such　a　way　that　it
does　not　reinscribe　the　preconstructed　elite　male　kyriocentric
framework　of　meaning　of　Western　culture　and　Christian
religion”（JMCSP，157－58）．
　However，　a　question　remains：How　can　these　two　Christological
trnages－i・e・，sapiential　creativity　and　praxis　f（）r　others　（especially
the　nepioi，　the　babes，　the　uneducated，　or　the　nobodies）－be
unified　as　one　in　a　feminist　discourse　on　Divine　Wisdom？I
don’tthink　Fiorenza　has　successfully　given　a　solution　to　this
question　by　her　view　of　G＊d－language　as“symbOlic，　metaphoric，
and　analogous”－a　view　commensuate　with　the　understanding
that“human　language　can　never　speak　adequately　about　divine
reality”（JMCSP，161）．To　be　sure，　she　is　right　in　criticizing　a
theory　of　language　that　subscribes　to　linguistic　determinism
because　she　believes：“Kyriocentric　language　is　often　understood
as　‘natural’　language　that　describes　and　reflects　reality　rather
than　as　a　grammatical　classification　system　that　constructs
reality　in　androcentric　kyriarchal　terms”（JMCSP，161）．　Yet，
this　does　not　mean　that　Fiorenza　has　successfully　shown　the
50
17．
18．
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very　symbolic，　metaphoric，　or　analogical“root”of　the　two
Christological　images　mentioned　above．
　　Seiichi　Yagi　and　Ryomin　Akizuki，　Dan〃諺αga　arauam齢nara’o々ゴ
（The　Time　for　Dharma　to　Become　Manifest）（Tokyo：Seidosha，
1990），pp．67，201－4，207，214，217，233，304－6．　See　also
Akizuki，“A　Zennist’sVision　of　the　Time　fbr　Dhama（Religious
Truth）to　Become　Manifest，”trans．　Tokiyuki　Nobuhara，　EimdZihist
－－bhristian　Stndies，　14　（1994），　23－32．
　　Mack　claims，　with　Birger　A．　Pearson，　that　the　addition　to
Paul’sletter　to　the　Thessalonians（1　Thess．2：14－16），　written
by　some　post－Pauline　author　after　the　destruction　of　the　temple
in　70　C．　E．，was　aimed　at　directing　Paul’sapocalyptic　pleachments
against　those　who　opposed　the　Christian　mission－namely，
against　the　Jews　who“killed　Jesus骸and“drove　us　out，”for
which　reason“God’swrath　has　overtaken　them　at　last”－a
judgmental　reference　to　the　destruction　of　the　temple．　This
idea，　in　Mack’sview，　seriously　tarnishes　the　inclusive　logic　of
the　Christ　myth，　and　it　presupposes　the　logic　of　Mark’spassion
narrative　which　runs　counter　to　that　of　the　Christ　myth（陥o
レレ㍗・o’召　the　1＞θω　Testa〃zθ％∫P’　The　ルlaking　oアthe　Christian　ル1ツ’ん
［｝larperSanllrancisco，1995］，114，151；here誼er　cited　as冊rr）．
The　accusation　against　the　Jews　of　killing　Jesus　by　the　author
of　l　Thess．2：14－16　and　the　author　of　the　Gospel　of　Mark
testifies　to　the　rise　of　a　new　trend　of　Christian　absolutism　after
Paul．　However，　it　was　crucial　for　them，　I　suppose，　to　resort　to
Paul’sauthority　for　later　versions　of　the　Christian　view　of
history　and　its　apocalyptic　finale　only　because　it　was　derived
from　and　undergirded　existentially－religiously　by　his　unique
Christiaii　seif－awareness　of　the“Christ　Iiving　in　me．”Commensurate
with　this，　probably，　are　two　different，　yet　closely　connected，
attitudes　toward　the　ritual　meal　by　Paul　and　Mark：whereas　in
the　Markan　version　of　the　ritual　symbols，　the　martyrological
derivation，　as　Mack　observes，　is　made　explicit　by　reference　to
the　blood　being“poured　out　for　many”（Mark　14：24），in　Paul’s
text　（1　Cor．　11：23b－25），　on　the　other　hand，　the　death　as
founding　event　for　the　community　has　been　emphasized，　not　by
the　spilling　of　the　blood，　but　by　using　the　idea　of　a“new
covenant”iBurton　L．　Mack，、4ルfyth　of　lnnocence’Mark　a加d
Chn’stian　O擁’№煤fms［Philadelphia：Fortress　Press，1988］，　p．118）．
　　There　are　certain　parallel　accounts　in　Paul’sletters　to　the
Romans　and　the　Galatians　and　in　the　Gospel　of　Thomas．　First，
Paul　was　neither　the　only，　nor　perhaps　even　the　first　person
within　the　early　Christian　movement　to　oppose　the　circumcision
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of　Gentiles　before　their　inclusion　in　Christian　communities
㎏ca慨鋤㎎53　reads：“｝lis　disciples　said　to　him，‘Is　circumcision
useful　or　not？’He　said　to　them，‘If　it　were　useful，　their　father
would　produce　children　already　circumcised　from　their　mother．
Rather，　the　true　circumcision　in　spirit　has　become　profitable　in
every　respect’．”Second，　in　dealing　with　the　problem　of　Hellenistic
Jewish　wisdom，　Paul　quotes　a　saying　from　the　Gospel　of　Thomas
in　l　Cor．2：9－10a：“But　as　it　is　written，‘What　no　eye　has
seen，　nor　ear　heard，　nor　the　human　heart　conceived，　what　God
prepared　for　those　who　love　him，’God　has　revealed　to　us
through　the　Spirit．”Thomas，　version（Saying　17），according　to
Stephen　J，　Patterson，　is　not　an　exact　replica，－but　reflects　the
s（）rt　of　diffe　re　nces　one　would　expect　to　have　resulted　from　oral
transmission：“iesus　said，‘I　shall　give　you　what　no　eye　has
seen，　what　no　ear　has　heard，　what　no　hand　has　touched，　what
has　not　arisen　in　the　human　heart’．”See　Stephen　J．　Patterson，
“The　Gospel　of　Thomas：Introduction，”in　John　S．　KloPPenborg
et　al．　eds．　with　Foreword　by　James　M．　Robinson，　Q　Thomas
Reader（Sonoma，　CA：Polebridge　Press，1990），pp．110－13．
